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WALKER LAKE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST IN
NEVADA’S WATERS
Michael C. Blumm*
Michael Benjamin Smith**

1

“The public expects this unique natural resource to be preserved
and for all of us to always be able to marvel at this massive
glittering body of water lying majestically in the midst of a dry
mountainous desert.”
–Justice Robert Rose2

Walker Lake, a terminal desert lake in western Nevada’s Mineral
County was once home to a thriving trout fishery that sustained the
Walker River Paiute Tribe. Now, it has become an ecological wasteland
due to irrigation diversions. The county, seeking some restoration of the
lake’s water level, recently intervened in a longstanding federal water
rights adjudication and relied on the public trust doctrine to support its
case.
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. We thank
Matthew Hebert, 2L, Lewis & Clark Law School, for assistance with the footnotes.
** J.D. and Certificate in Natural Resources Law, summa cum laude, Lewis & Clark Law
School, 2021.
1 Photograph of Walker Lake in Water Conservation, WALKER BASIN CONSERVANCY,
https://www.walkerbasin.org/water-conservation [https://perma.cc/2ADB-7JYC] (last visited Feb.
3, 2022).
2 Mineral Cnty. v. State, Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res. (Mineral County I), 20 P.3d 800,
808 (Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring).
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In 2020, in a landmark decision, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that
the public trust doctrine applied to all waters and all water rights in the
state. The court also recognized that the doctrine not only was embedded
in the state’s constitution and water code but also was inherent in the
state’s sovereignty. Consequently, the public trust doctrine is now
antecedent to all water rights in the state. Despite the doctrine’s
seniority, however, the court ruled that the state’s policy concerning the
finality of water rights forbade reallocation of existing water rights. The
court did not address how to fulfill both the public trust doctrine and
junior water rights short of reallocation, a chore left for the federal
district court that has been overseeing the Walker River adjudication for
some 120 years.
This article explains the case, its context, and the questions that await
resolution. We maintain that the district court can reconcile the public
trust doctrine with the state’s policy of finality, and substantially restore
the lake’s ecology. If we are correct, the Walker Lake decision will have
precedential value throughout the West in a climate-changed era in
which water will be in short supply and conflicts between water rights
and public trust resources like Walker Lake are sure to increase.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 2
I. THE WALKER LAKE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS DECLINE .............. 8
II. THE 1936 WALKER RIVER DECREE ..................................... 12
III. THE NEVADA PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE BEFORE THE
WALKER LAKE DECISION.................................................... 16
IV. THE BEGINNING OF THE WALKER LAKE LITIGATION .......... 24
V. THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MINERAL
COUNTY V. LYON COUNTY .................................................... 27
VI. THE DOOR TO RELIEF: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S SUSTAINING OF
MINERAL COUNTY’S CLAIM ............................................... 32
VII. ARGUMENTS ON REMAND TO THE DECREE COURT ............. 34
CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 36

INTRODUCTION
Walker Lake, a natural desert terminal lake in the shadow of majestic
12,000-foot Mount Grant, is a remnant of the massive Lake Lahontan
which, in the Pleistocene Era, covered most of what is now northern
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Nevada and parts of California and Oregon. 3 The lake is in western
Nevada, about 70 miles from the California border, and is fed by the
Walker River which flows about a hundred miles from the Sierra Nevada
in California east into Nevada. The area was the ancestral home of the
Agai-Dicutta Numa people—a Band of the Northern Paiute Nation. For
tens of thousands of years they subsisted on the lake’s trout, as well as
small game, local grasses, berries, and nuts.4 The lake’s massive
Lahontan cutthroat trout, which would migrate up the river to spawn each
spring, formed the basis of the natives’ diet,5 and they came to be known
as the “trout eaters people.”6
In 1874, President Grant established the Walker River Paiute
Reservation by executive order7 after the native people successfully
resisted removal to the Pyramid Lake Reservation, about 100 miles to the
northwest.8 The Reservation enabled the natives to remain on their
traditional wintering grounds rather than be lumped together with all the
other Paiutes in Nevada.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, western settlement
brought farmers and ranchers to the Walker Basin. The settlers diverted
Walker River flows to irrigate crops like hay and pasture for cattle. They
proceeded to form the Walker River Irrigation District in 1919, building
two dams on the east and west forks of the Walker River to expand
3 Brian Bahouth, Walker Lake—The Legal Saga Continues with the Endgame in Question,
SIERRA NEVADA ALLY (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.sierranevadaally.org/2020/09/29/walkerlake-the-legal-saga-continues-with-the-end-game-in-question/ [https://perma.cc/PZ6A-HD2M].
Terminal lakes are endorheic, meaning they have no outlet. Lake level of such lakes are therefore
a balance between inflow and evaporation. See id.
4 See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
5 See Bahouth, supra note 3.
6 According to the tribe, its name is Agai Dicutta, which means “Trout Eaters”; its name for
Walker Lake is Agai Pah, meaning “Trout Water.” Brief for Walker River Paiute Tribe as Amici
Curiae Supporting Neither Party, at 1 n.1, Mineral Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty. (Mineral County II), 473
P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 15-16342). In the indigenous language of the Paiutes, the word “pah”
means water broadly, not “lake” narrowly. Thus, the names of various other places in Nevada and
some of Utah like Tonopah, Ibapah, Pahranagat, and so forth. For background on Walker Lake, the
Walker Lake Basin, its original inhabitants, and the effects of white settlement, see History,
WALKER
BASIN
CONSERVANCY,
https://www.walkerbasin.org/history-of-walker-lake
[https://perma.cc/N644-XW5X]. See also WALKER RIVER PAIUTE TRIBE, https://www.wrpt.org/
[https://perma.cc/2LPD-GVYS] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022). Walker Lake is the namesake of
the Walker Lane, a geological trough in which it sits that extends from Oregon to Death Valley and
beyond. John C. Fremont, the explorer who crossed the Sierra Nevada in 1844, named the area
after Joseph R. Walker, a mountain man who scouted the area for him in the 1840s. See Mark O.
Rudo, Nat’l Park Serv., Walker Pass, Nat’l Register of Historic Places—Nomination and Inventory
2 (1989); NEV. ST. WRITERS’ PROJECT, WORKS PROGRESS ADMIN., ORIGIN OF PLACE NAMES:
NEVADA 53 (1941).
7 President Grant’s executive order of March 20, 1874, in THE INDIAN OFFICE, EXECUTIVE
ORDERS RELATING TO THE INDIAN RESERVES FROM MAY 14, 1855, TO JULY 1, 1902, at 72 (1902).
8 WALKER RIVER PAIUTE TRIBE, supra note 6.
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irrigation to serve some 500 farms and ranches in Smith and Mason
Valleys in Lyon County, Nevada, and Antelope Valley in Mono County,
California.9 In 1935, the federal government built Weber Dam on the
lower portion of Walker River to supply irrigation on the Walker River
Paiute Tribe’s Reservation.10 The increased irrigation dramatically
reduced inflow to Walker Lake, increasing the concentration of total
suspended solids in the lake to such an extent that it can no longer support
native fish and wildlife populations.11
Due to the deteriorated condition of the diminished lake, the “trout
eaters” can no longer fish for trout. Today, the Walker River Paiute Tribe
is a federally recognized tribe of about 1,200 members.12 The reservation,
located about 100 miles southeast of Reno, consists of about 325,000
acres devoted mostly to grazing livestock. As the lake declined by about
170 feet from the nineteenth century to today,13 the reservation’s former
riparian areas became uplands and now grow crops, largely alfalfa. The
lake’s trout were last harvested in 2009, the same year an annual local
loon festival for migratory birds that use Walker Lake as a stopover on
the Pacific Flyway was cancelled. 14
The cause of this environmental disaster is not debatable; the desert
lake’s survival depends on inflow from the Walker River and its
tributaries.15 For over a century, the flows of the river have been dammed
and diverted to produce forage crops. The reduced inflow severely
damaged the water quality of the lake by raising the level of dissolved
solids, making trout life impossible.16 Trout restoration likely will require
a substantial rise in lake level of about fifty feet in elevation,17 a daunting
9 Bahouth, supra note 3; WALKER RIVER IRRIGATION DIST., http://www.wrid.us/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2022).
10 History, WALKER BASIN CONSERVANCY, supra note 6.
11 Suspended solids increase when inflows are insufficient to keep up with evaporation. See
Benjamin Spillman, How Nevada’s Walker Lake Is Poised to Become ‘Great Restoration Story of
the West’, RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL (July 22, 2019), https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2019/07/22/
nevada-walker-lake-environmental-recovery/1688518001/ [https://perma.cc/8R9X-9C9W].
12 Sudhiti Naskar, Nevada Native American Tribes Wait for Federal Aid, A “Second Thought”,
SIERRA NEVADA ALLY (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.sierranevadaally.org/2020/04/24/nevadanative-american-tribes-wait-for-federal-aid-a-second-thought/ [https://perma.cc/LGR9-K32Z].
13 See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
14 See Bahouth, supra note 3 (describing the lake as a “saline puddle” and the intersection of
the river and the lake as an “ooze of mud”); History, WALKER BASIN CONSERVANCY, supra note
6 (discussing the Loon Festival); infra text accompanying notes 41–46 (discussing overall ecologic
decline of the lake).
15 As discussed infra Part VII, a significant portion of the inflows to Walker Lake occur through
surface and subsurface flows and precipitation—although not nearly enough to sustain the lake.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 39–46.
17 Second Amended Complaint in Intervention at 5, 7, United States v. Walker River Irrigation
Dist. (Walker River IV), No. 3:73-CV-00128-MMD-WGC (In Equity No. C-125) (D. Nev. June 30,
2021) [hereinafter 2021 Amended Complaint].
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prospect in an era in which climate change is producing rising water
temperatures and diminishing water supplies. 18 Despite these
circumstances, the Water Lake Conservancy, a nonprofit organization
established in 2015 to administer a federally funded program of water
rights acquisition to restore the lake, 19 has been acquiring water rights
from willing sellers. As of 2021, the conservancy reportedly had acquired
some 53 percent of the water necessary to reach an interim water quality
goal.20
Acquisition of water rights on the market is a slow and uncertain
process, however. Most water rights in the Walker Basin are quite old,
and some pre-date the adoption of the Nevada Water Code in 1905. Old
water rights usually lack the efficiencies required of more recent rights,
yet under the state’s temporally grounded prior appropriation doctrine,
these rights enjoy the greatest legal protection.21 Nevada could require
efficiency improvements if it updated its definitions of “beneficial use”
and “waste” because the scope of water rights-holders’ entitlements are
measured by the former, and no one may waste water. 22 There have been
few serious efforts to modernize Western water law in this fashion,
however. 23 Fortunately, the recent decision of the Nevada Supreme Court
in Mineral County v. Lyon County (Mineral County II),24 concerning the

18 See
Climate Change Indicators: Lake Temperature, EPA (Apr. 2021),
https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-lake-temperature
[https://perma.cc/9DLT-DCY9] (showing an increase in surface temperatures in lakes across North
America from 1985–2009).
19 Former Sen. Harry Reid authored the Desert Terminal Lakes Act in 2002, Pub. L. No. 107171 (enacted May 13, 2002) that has been amended several times and now provides federal funding
to help restore Walker, Pyramid, and Summit Lakes in Nevada. Over the years, Congress has
appropriated about $300 million for the restoration of these lakes. See Spillman, supra note 11.
20 History, WALKER BASIN CONSERVANCY, supra note 6.
21 See generally FRED W. WELDEN, HISTORY OF WATER LAW IN NEVADA AND THE WESTERN
UNITED STATES (Nevada Legislative Counsel’s Bureau, Background Paper 03-2) (Jan. 2003),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Publications/Bkground/BP03-02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VAA5-58AN].
22 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 12.02(c)(2) (Amy K. Kelley et al., eds., 3d ed. 2021). See
also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 533.460, 533.463 (establishing unlawfulness of waste); id. § 533.035
(“Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water.”).
23 See generally Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENV’T L. 919, 961–62 (1998). For an overview of the
inefficiencies in prior appropriation law, see Charles F. Wilkinson, Aldo Leopold and Western
Water Law: Thinking Perpendicular to the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 24 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 1 (1989); see also Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation, 1848–1991, 21
ENV’T L. v (1991) (amusing apocryphal account). Reed Benson suggested some time ago that,
based on case studies, prior appropriation had “lost its force” as controlling principle of Western
water law. Reed D. Benson, Alive but Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s
Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 675, 714 (2012).
24 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020).
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application of the public trust doctrine to Walker Lake, may herald a new
day.
Asked by the Ninth Circuit, which was reviewing the decision of a
federal district court with jurisdiction over Walker Basin water rights, to
clarify the state’s public trust doctrine, the Nevada Supreme Court
announced that the doctrine applied to all water in the state, including
vested water rights.25 The court confirmed the holding of its 2011
decision, Lawrence v. Clark County:26 the public trust was not only
embedded in the Nevada constitution and the state’s water law statutes,
but was also inherent in the state’s sovereignty.27 The court then
concluded, however, that because the Nevada legislature had made clear
that the policy of the state’s water law concerned the finality of water
rights, the public trust doctrine could not require the judicial reallocation
of water to protect trust resources like Walker Lake, even though the
doctrine antedated any water rights adjudicated under the state’s prior
appropriation doctrine.28 The result of the decision seemed both
potentially revolutionary and incoherent: the ancient public trust applied
to and protected all waters and water rights but forbade reallocation. This
article attempts to unpack the ambiguities in the court’s decision and to
suggest a way forward for Nevada as well as other Western states in
reconciling the apparently divergent public trust and prior appropriation
doctrines.
We maintain that the Mineral County II decision, although not entirely
conceptually coherent,29 should be understood as signaling a new day for
25

Id. at 421–26; see infra Part V (discussing Mineral County II).
254 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2011) (en banc).
27 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 424 (construing Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 612–13); see also infra
text accompanying notes 106–124 (reviewing Lawrence).
28 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 429 (holding that “[t]o permit reallocation would create
uncertainties for future development in Nevada and undermine the public interest in finality and
thus also the management of these resources consistent with the public trust doctrine”); id. at 425
(recognizing expressly that “the public trust doctrine applies to rights already adjudicated and
settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation, such that the doctrine has always inhered in the
water law of Nevada as a qualification or constraint in every appropriated right”). See also infra
Part V (discussing Mineral County II).
29 In reaching the conclusion that the Nevada’s public trust doctrine would not permit
reallocation of settled water rights, the Mineral County II majority deferred to the Nevada
legislature’s century-old policy judgments enacted into law decades before the effects of overappropriation on Walker Lake became evident. 473 P.3d at 426–30. In so doing, the court
disregarded a fundamental principle of the public trust doctrine: the doctrine acts as a check on
legislative action by empowering courts to override legislative policy determinations where state
laws impermissibly convey interests in public resources without due consideration of public trust
values. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 450–55 (1892) (holding that a state
law through which the Illinois legislature attempted to convey property of “immense value” and
“public concern” was, “if not absolutely void on its face,” then at least “subject to revocation”); see
also Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
26
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public trust resources in Nevada. Though the court ruled that the
reallocation of water rights is impermissible, that does not mean that prior
appropriation water rights are insulated from the changes necessary to
restore neglected trust resources like Walker Lake. In fact, the Nevada
court’s decision could augur significant changes ahead for water law in
other Western states, as we explain in the conclusion of this article.
Section I of the article explains the Walker Lake ecosystem and its
demise at the hands of the prior appropriation water rights system.
Section II explores a critical 1936 federal court water rights decree that
controls water rights in the basin but which shortchanged federal water
rights that should have been reserved for the Walker River Paiute Tribe’s
fisheries. Section III explores the Nevada public trust doctrine prior to the
Mineral County II decision, focusing on the important decision in
Lawrence v. Clark County and former Justice Rose’s influential
concurring opinion in Mineral County v. State of Nevada, Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources (Mineral County I).30 Section IV
turns to the Mineral County II decision’s origins in the federal courts,
culminating with the Ninth Circuit’s certification of questions about the
state’s public trust doctrine to the Nevada Supreme Court. Section V
analyzes the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Mineral County II,
including the dissent, which raised many issues that the majority avoided
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 509 (1970) (recognizing public trust law as “a technique by
which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative process”).
The Nevada Supreme Court had recognized as much a decade earlier in Lawrence, in which the
court understood that the public trust doctrine “arises from the inherent limitations on the state’s
sovereign power,” and expressly concluded that “any legislation that purports to convey public trust
lands is subject to judicial review.” 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011). Despite several favorable
citations to Lawrence, see Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 424–25, the court simply deferred to
century-old legislative policy judgments about when water resource allocations would serve the
public interest—judgments made long before Walker Lake’s decline became evident. See also infra
note 191 (discussing the court’s deference to legislative policy judgments with respect to the
importance of finality in water rights).
In addition, the Mineral County II court’s conclusion that “Nevada’s water statutes are consistent
with the public trust doctrine,” 473 P.3d at 426, is questionable. The court embraced an expansive
notion of “public use” under the doctrine of prior appropriation, conflating the concepts of “public
interest” and “public use.” Id. As the dissent aptly noted, if beneficial use is by definition a “public
use,” and any “public use” is in the “public interest,” then any benefit deriving from water use,
including “reduc[ing] the price of beef for dinner,” would justify even those allocations made
“without regard to the deleterious impacts . . . on Nevada’s natural resources.” Id. at 434 (Pickering,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, the court’s perfunctory conclusion that
Nevada’s statutory scheme “sufficiently places an affirmative duty” on the state to ensure “that
public trust resources are available for future generations,” id. at 427, is belied by Walker Lake’s
decline. As Mineral County asserted, “The proof is in the pudding . . . and the pudding in this case
is the devastation of Walker Lake’s fisheries, wildlife habitat, recreation[] and scenic trust values
and uses due to the overappropriation of the system.” Appellants’ Reply Brief at 13, Mineral County
II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 75917).
30 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001).
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and which remain open. Resolution of these issues involves reconciling
the antecedent public trust doctrine with the subsequent prior
appropriation rights. Such a resolution must thereby protect trust
resources like the lake while also observing the policy of finality
articulated by the court majority. Section VI turns to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision after the case returned to the federal courts post Mineral County
II. Section VII reviews the arguments that Mineral County has raised on
remand to the Decree Court. We suggest that the Nevada court’s decision
contains several interpretations of the public trust doctrine worthy of
emulation in other states, particularly those states that consider water to
be publicly owned.
I.

THE WALKER LAKE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS DECLINE
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The headwaters of the Walker River’s two forks, the East Walker River
and the West Walker River, emerge from snowmelt31 in northern
California’s Sierra Nevada mountains. The two forks wind north and east
respectively, crossing California’s eastern border before merging near
Yerington, Nevada, approximately forty miles east of Lake Tahoe. From
that confluence, the Walker River flows north some twenty miles before
turning sharply southeast as the river bends around the northern tip of
Nevada’s Wassuk mountain range, then runs south through the Walker
River Paiute Indian Reservation where it flows through Campbell Valley
and enters the Weber Reservoir. 32 Twenty-one miles south of the
reservoir, the river empties its remaining water into Walker Lake, a
thirteen-by-five mile desert lake nestled along the east side of the Wassuk
Range in Nevada’s Mineral County. By the time the river reaches Walker
Lake, however, irrigators have diverted and consumed virtually all of its
remaining water. 33
Upstream agricultural diversions from the Walker River have exacted
an enormous toll on the ecology of Walker Lake, and one of the few
remaining perennial, natural terminal lakes in the Great Basin.34 Prior to
1860, when western settlers began diverting flows from the river for
irrigation purposes,35 most of the Sierra Nevada snowmelt feeding the
East and West forks of the Walker River that was not lost to evaporation
flowed into Walker Lake.36 But between 1882 (when the lake was first
measured37) and 2021, upstream diversions dropped the lake’s volume
from approximately 9 million acre-feet to 1.135 million acre-feet—an 87
percent decline in 139 years—with a corresponding 168-foot drop in
elevation, shrinking the lake’s surface by half. 38 The plummeting water

31 Hydrology
of
the
Walker
River
Basin,
U.S.
GEOLOGICAL
SURV.,
https://nevada.usgs.gov/walker/index.html [https://perma.cc/L6RG-VJFP] (last visited Feb. 1,
2022).
32 Mineral County I, 20 P.3d 800, 802 (Nev. 2001).
33 Except in exceptionally wet years, virtually no surface inflows have reached the lake in the
past few decades. The Walker Basin Conservancy’s water rights acquisition program, which
purchases water rights on the open market and transfers those rights to instream use that benefits
Walker Lake, has recently started to provide minor inflows to the lake. See Supplemental Brief of
Appellants Mineral County and Walker Lake Working Group at 5, United States v. Walker River
Irrigation Dist. (Walker River III), 986 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2021) (No. 15-16342).
34 Hydrology of the Walker River Basin, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., supra note 31.
35 United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 335 (9th Cir. 1939).
36 Hydrology of the Walker River Basin, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., supra note 31.
37 Mineral Cnty. v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 900 F.3d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 2018).
38 2021 Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 5 (citing U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., SCIENTIFIC
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 2007-5012, BATHYMETRY OF WALKER LAKE, WEST-CENTRAL
NEVADA, at 1, app. A (2007), https://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2007/5012/pdf/sir20075012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9B9T-D2AS] and referencing data available at USGS Station 10288500, Walker
Lake near Hawthorne, NV, http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nv/nwis/uv/?site_no=10288500&
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agency_cd=USGS&amp [https://perma.cc/GD33-N9JZ]). The map below contrasts historical lake
levels between 1868 and 2017 and lake level goals.

Appellants’ Opening Brief at 8, Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 75917)
(reproducing 2017 map from the Walker Basin Conservancy website).
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volume produced a corresponding spike in salinity and total dissolved
solids. In 1882, the lake’s salinity was 2,500 milligrams per liter; by 2021,
that number had increased eightfold, to some 22,000 milligrams per
liter.39 The result was severe eutrophication (degradation of water
quality), which has altered the lake ecosystem chemically, physically, and
biologically.40
The most apparent change over the last few decades has been a
devastating loss of the lake’s biodiversity.41 Before the diversions,
Walker Lake was the center of a thriving ecosystem that supported four
native fish species—the tui chub, the speckled dace, the Tahoe sucker,
and the Lahontan cutthroat trout42 (the state fish of Nevada43)—and the
lake historically provided a rare and vital habitat for dozens of species of
migratory fish-eating birds, including white pelicans, double-crested
cormorants, herons, and avocets. 44 The last documented Lahontan
cutthroat trout perished in 2009.45 No fish remain.46 Even the oncethriving insect populations have disappeared.47 The decline in Walker

39 2021 Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 5 (citing National Water Information System:
Web Interface, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://nwis.waterdata.usgs.gov/usa/nwis/qwdata/
?site_no=384200118431901 [https://perma.cc/KL3G-N7R2r]); Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 9,
Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2018) (No. 75917).
40 DRS. SAXON E. SHARPE, MARY E. CABLK & JAMES M. THOMAS, DESERT RSCH. INST., THE
WALKER BASIN, NEVADA AND CALIFORNIA: P HYSICAL ENVIRONMENT, HYDROLOGY, AND
BIOLOGY, Pub. No. 41231, at 31 (May 1, 2008) (“Increased TDS, increased water temperature, and
decreased dissolved oxygen concentration have played a role in altering nutrient cycling, changing
biotic communities, and affecting the extent and quality of fish habitat, particularly in summer
months.”).
41 Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 9, Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 75917).
42 SHARPE, CABLK & THOMAS, supra note 40, at 36.
43 NEV. REV. STAT. § 235.075 (2021).
44 SHARPE, CABLK & THOMAS, supra note 40, at 27–28. In 1885, the local Walker Lake Bulletin
humorously reported “that Walker Lake was so crowded with Lahontan cutthroat trout that during
the middle of the day long rows of the fish could be seen lying at the water’s edge on the sand
sunning themselves.” GARY A. HORTON, WALKER RIVER CHRONOLOGY, II-12–13 (1996),
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/publications/River%20Chronologies/Walker%20River
%20Chronology.pdf [https://perma.cc/A882-4LPY].
45 Email from Kris Urqhart, Fisheries Biologist, Nevada Dept. of Wildlife, to Glenn Bunch,
President, Walker Lake Working Grp, (Aug. 31, 2021, 10:51AM) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Urqhart Letter].
46 Id. The tui chub were present until 2013 or early 2014, and the last non-native game species
were unable to survive as of several years before 2009. Id. In the past the Nevada Department of
Wildlife stocked Lahontan cutthroat trout through a hatchery after dam construction prevented the
native trout from spawning upstream, SHARPE, CABLK & THOMAS, supra note 40, at 32, but that
program was discontinued in 2009. Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 8, Mineral County II, 473 P.3d
418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 75917); Urqhart Letter, supra note 45.
47 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, WALKER LAKE ECOSYSTEM: RESEARCH AND MONITORING
SUMMARY REPORT
2006–2013,
at
5–6
(2013),
https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/550a1fc8e4b0e1de27f15703/t/59533409b11be18d82b0b4b5/1498625059456/FWS-WalkerLake-Ecosystem-Report-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/35HV-ERW9].
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Lake’s ecology has, of course, devastated the lake’s economic,
recreational, and aesthetic values for the public at large. 48
II. THE 1936 WALKER RIVER DECREE
The headwaters of the current Walker River litigation, a subproceeding of a case that has been ongoing for nearly a century, lie in a
dispute that arose in the early twentieth century between two cattle
ranchers. In 1902, Miller & Lux, a cattle and land company owned by
Henry Miller (the “Cattle King of California”), 49 filed suit in Nevada
federal court seeking to enjoin some 150 upper river water users in the
Walker River Basin from diverting waters to which the company claimed
a right50—users that included arch-rival Rickey Land & Cattle Co., owned
by Thomas Rickey (the “Cattle King of the West”).51 In federal court,
Miller claimed an appropriation water right to 943 cubic-feet per second
(cfs) of the Walker River for use on his Nevada lands. 52 Two years later,
Rickey filed a separate suit against Miller in California state court,
claiming a right to a flow of 2,079 cfs for use on his California lands.53
The Nevada federal court enjoined the state court proceedings,
recognizing that where state and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over a dispute, “established fundamental rules” dictate that
the court in which a suit is first filed holds prior and exclusive jurisdiction
over the dispute and any ancillary matters. 54 The Ninth Circuit recently

48 Appellants’ Opening Brief at 9–10, Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No.
75917).
49 See Bernard Taper, The King of Ranchers, AM. HERITAGE (Aug. 1967); United States v. U.S.
Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 893 F.3d 578, 588 (9th Cir. 2018). Miller and Lux were at the center of
perhaps the most eventful water law case of nineteenth century California, in which the state
supreme court, by a 4–3 vote, decided that the riparian rights of Miller and Lux prevailed over the
prior appropriation rights of Haggin. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
50 Miller & Lux v. Rickey, 146 F. 574, 575–76 (C.C.D. Nev. 1906); Miller & Lux v. Rickey,
123 F. 604, 604–05 (C.C.D. Nev. 1903); see also Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218
U.S. 258, 259–60 (1910) (discussing the history of Rickey and Miller’s dispute). Miller brought
the federal case in the Circuit Court for the District of Nevada, but Congress abolished the Circuit
Court System in 1911, transferring jurisdiction to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.
See The Structure of the Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/8276
[https://perma.cc/5U2R-DXCE] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022); Walker River II, 890 F.3d 1161, 1165
n.4 (9th Cir. 2018).
51 United States v. U.S. Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 893 F.3d at 588.
52 Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 152 F. 11, 12 (9th Cir. 1907).
53 See id. at 12–13 (discussing the parties’ claims in the earlier proceedings). Rickey claimed
1,575 cfs from the West Fork of the Walker River, and 504 cfs from the East Fork. Id.
54 Miller & Lux v. Rickey, 146 F. 574, 586–88 (C.C.D. Nev. 1906). As the Nevada federal court
explained, “The enforcement of the rule that the court which first takes jurisdiction of the parties
and subject-matter of a suit must retain and exercise it to the exclusion of any and all proceedings
in other courts until its jurisdiction is exhausted by the final judgment or decree is absolutely
essential to the due and proper administration of justice.” Id. at 588.
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explained the broad principle underlying its affirmance of the Decree
Court’s decision to enjoin the California state court proceedings:
Because any given usufruct[ua]ry right to a flow has an inherent
connection to all other such rights in the same stream,
appropriative rights are conclusively established only by
reference to all other competing rights. We [thus] held that this
naturally requires jurisdiction over the entire res of the Walker
River.55

In other words, because prior and exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
court extended to all water rights in the Walker River, the Nevada federal
court would adjudicate disputes involving withdrawals both in Nevada
and upstream in California.56 Rickey appealed, and, in an opinion
authored by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court affirmed, upholding
federal jurisdiction.57
After nearly a decade of fact-finding and hearings, the federal district
court issued the 1919 “Rickey Decree,” temporarily settling water rights
to the Walker River.58 The Ricky Decree confirmed that the Nevada
federal district court would retain jurisdiction to adjudicate any future
disputes over water rights to the Walker River. 59
The Walker River litigation began in 1924 when the United States, in
its sovereign capacity and as trustee for the Paiute Tribe, filed an action
in the Nevada district court seeking to quiet title to water rights for the
reservation.60 The federal government had set aside and begun to irrigate
lands for the reservation in 1859, although an 1874 Executive Order
officially withdrew the lands from sale and established the reservation.61
In the 1936 adjudication, the federal government claimed a pre-existing,
vested water right to 150 cubic feet per second (cfs) from the Walker
River needed to irrigate some 11,000 acres of arable lands on the

55 United States v. U.S. Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 893 F.3d 578, 589 (9th Cir. 2018) (italics added)
(construing Ricky Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 152 F. 11, aff’d 218 U.S. 258 (1910)).
56 See also Mineral County I, 20 P.3d 806, 806 (Nev. 2001) (noting that “Nevada law treats
water rights as real property” and that the “general rule is that the first court, whether state or
federal, which assumes jurisdiction over real property is entitled to maintain continuing and
exclusive jurisdiction over that property” (footnotes omitted)).
57 Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U.S. 258, 263 (1910).
58 Pac. Livestock Co. v. Thomas Rickey, In Equity No. 731, Final Decree, 1919 WL 348439
(D. Nev. 1919). The Rickey Decree designated the State Engineer of Nevada as the “commissioner”
responsible for apportioning and distributing the waters of the Walker River, in accordance with
the decree, in both California and Nevada. Id. at 64.
59 Id. at 64–65.
60 United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 11 F. Supp. 158, 159 (D. Nev. 1935).
61 Id. at 159–60, 163.
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reservation.62 The government claimed no water for the fish that
historically were a principal source of the tribe’s subsistence. 63
The district court denied the government’s claim, holding that the
government had “reserved no rights” to water for use on the reservation:
the government’s only rights came from Nevada state law of prior
appropriation,64 under which usufructuary water rights date from the time
of, and are based on the extent of, actual use.65 The court subsequently
issued the “1936 Decree” (or “Decree”), which awarded water rights to
the United States and other parties (including rights awarded in the
court’s 1919 Rickey Decree).66 The government appealed, arguing that it
possessed reserved water rights “to the extent necessary to supply the
irrigable lands” of the reservation.67 The Ninth Circuit agreed, reversing
the district court. Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Winters v.

62

Id. at 159–60.
See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. Even if the tribe was relying on irrigated
agriculture at the time of the adjudication, it would not have abandoned its fisheries. Only Congress
may terminate tribal usufructuary rights, and only if it does so clearly. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 195 (1999).
64 Walker River Irrigation Dist., 11 F. Supp. at 167. The Nevada Supreme Court confirmed
Nevada’s adoption of the law of prior appropriation soon after statehood (1864). Lobdell v.
Simpson, 2 Nev. 274 (1866). Under the traditional doctrine of prior appropriation, “The first
appropriator of the water of a stream passing through the public lands . . . has the right to insist that
the water shall be subject to his use and enjoyment to the extent of his original appropriation, and
that its quality shall not be impaired so as to defeat the purpose of the appropriation.” Id. at 277–
78 (quoting Butte Canal & Ditch Co. v. Vaughn, 11 Cal. 143, 153–54 (1858)). The right of the first
appropriator is “a perpetual right to continue taking the same amount for the same use,
notwithstanding conflicting needs by those who come later—including the general public.” Erin
Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water Allocation, and Mono Lake: The Historic Saga of
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45 ENV’T L. 561, 576–77 (2015). The doctrine of
prior appropriation has now been codified in Nevada. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370; see
also Greg Walch, Water Law: Treading Water Law—A Nevada Water Rights Primer, 6 NEV. L.
18, 18 (1998) (discussing the history and codification of prior appropriation in Nevada). For a
further discussion of the evolution of Nevada water law, see generally Sylvia Harrison, The
Historical Development of Nevada Water Law, 5 UNIV. DENVER WATER L. REV. 148 (2001).
65 United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. C-125, 11 F. Supp. 158, 166–67 (D. Nev.
1935).
66 United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. C-125, Final Decree, at 10–11 (D. Nev.
Apr. 1936), amended by Order for Entry of Amended Decree to Conform to Writ of Mandate Etc.
at 2–3, United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. C-125 (D. Nev. 1940) [hereinafter Order
for Amendment]. Based only on the federal government’s prior diversions, the 1936 Decree
awarded the federal government approximately 23 cubic feet per second, with priority dates ranging
from 1868 to 1886. Id. at 10. The government sought reconsideration of the court’s findings,
asserting that under Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the government had made an
“implied reservation” of water for the reservation. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist.,
14 F. Supp 10, 11 (D. Nev. 1936). The district court, refusing to “destroy[] the rights of the white
pioneers” for the benefit of the reservation, summarily dismissed the government’s argument. Id.
67 United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 335 (9th Cir. 1939).
63
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United States,68 the court of appeals held that the federal government,
through its 1859 order to set aside lands for the future reservation,
impliedly reserved water “to the extent reasonably necessary to supply
the needs of the Indians.”69 The Nevada district court subsequently
amended the 1936 Decree to include increased flows to the reservation, 70
sufficient to irrigate 2,100 acres during the 180-day irrigation seasons and
to support domestic and stock watering purposes.71
The amended 1936 Decree thus recognized the implied reserved water
rights of the federal government as trustee for the Paiute Tribe. 72 The
Decree also prohibited any party to the earlier litigation from thereafter
relitigating any claim to water rights in the Walker River Basin. 73 Finally,
the Decree affirmed that the Nevada district court will continue to
“retain[] jurisdiction . . . for the purpose of changing the duty of water or
for correcting or modifying th[e] decree.” 74 The district court thereby
became the so-called “Decree Court,”75 adjudicating claims to water
68 207 U.S. 564 (1908). In Winters, the Supreme Court held that the federal government, by
creating the Fort Belknap reservation in its sovereign capacity as trustee for Indian tribes, had
impliedly reserved water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. Id. at 574–77.
69 Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d at 339–40. The 1859 order came from the General
Land Office. Id. at 338. The Ninth Circuit held that “[i]t would be irrational to assume that the
[government’s] intent was merely to set aside the arid soil without reserving the means of rendering
it productive,” and that “[t]he settlers who took up lands in the valleys of the stream were not
justified in closing their eyes to the obvious necessities of the Indians already occupying the
reservation below.” Id. at 339. The Court, however, ratified the special master’s finding that only
26.25 cfs of water would be sufficient, based on the reservation’s population trends over seventy
years, to irrigate the requisite 2,100 acres, id. at 340—an increase of only 3.25 cfs above the water
right granted to the federal government under the original 1936 Decree.
70 Order for Amendment, supra note 66.
71 Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d at 340. Recognized purposes also included “power
purposes to the extent [then] used by the Government[] during the non-irrigating season.” Id. No
mention was made of water for fish.
72 See United States v. U.S. Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 893 F.3d 578, 589 (9th Cir. 2018)
(construing United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. C-125, Final Decree, 10–11 (D.
Nev. Apr. 1936), amended by Order for Amendment, supra note 66, at 2–3).
73 See United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. C-125, Final Decree, 71–72 (D. Nev.
Apr. 1936), amended by Order for Amendment, supra note 66, at 2–3.
74 Id. at 72–73. The Decree also provided that the court may designate a “Water Master” that
will “apportion[] and distribut[e] the waters of the Walker River, its forks and tributaries in the
State of Nevada and the State of California” in accordance with the decree. Id. at 71–72. In 1937,
the court designated a “Water Master” by creating the U.S. Board of Water Commissioners, a sixmember court-appointed body responsible for apportioning and distributing the waters of the
Walker River in accordance with the Decree. U.S. Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 893 F.3d at 589. “The
Board functions in a ministerial, as well as a quasi-judicial, capacity.” Order, United States v.
Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. C-125 (D. Nev. Feb. 13, 1990). Today, a federal Water Master
works “as an officer of the court under the direction of the Board of Water Commissioners.” Robert
Perea, New Watermaster Dedicated to Enforcing Decree, RENO GAZETTE J. (Nov. 27, 2015),
https://www.rgj.com/story/news/local/mason-valley/2015/11/27/new-watermaster-dedicatedenforcing-decree/76450452/ [https://perma.cc/NY7R-QAGC].
75 U.S. Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 893 F.3d at 589.
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rights in the Walker River Basin since 1902, when the dueling “cattle
kings” entered the Nevada courthouse to settle their dispute.
The 1936 Decree warrants some scrutiny. Neither the government nor
the Decree Court paid any attention to the tribe’s view of the purposes of
the reservation, although, two decades earlier, the Supreme Court in
Winters v. United States had instructed that “[b]y a rule of interpretation
of agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be
resolved from the standpoint of the Indians.”76 Although the tribe ceded
the land surrounding Walker Lake to the federal government in 1906, that
land cession would not necessarily terminate the tribe’s right to continue
to fish absent clear intent to terminate not only the land title but also the
usufructuary rights.77 By not inquiring what the tribe thought the purposes
of its reservation were, the government made it impossible for the Decree
Court to give effect to the rule of interpretation the Supreme Court laid
down.
III. THE NEVADA PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE BEFORE
THE WALKER LAKE DECISION
“In its most fundamental terms, the public trust doctrine provides
that . . . all of a state’s navigable waterways are held in trust by
the state for the benefit of the people and that a state official’s
control of those waters is forever subject to that trust.”78

Although the Nevada Supreme Court failed to expressly recognize the
public trust doctrine79 under Nevada law until its 2011 decision in

76 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908). Although the federal government considered tribal fishing when it
set aside lands, the government did not argue for a reserved right, Walker River Irrigation Dist.,
104 F.2d at 338–40, perhaps because there were plenty of fish in the lake 80 years ago and the
government did not consider a reserved water right foreseeably necessary for the tribe to continue
its fishing culture. Reserved water rights are limited to those “necessary” to carry out the purposes
of a reservation. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976) (holding that reserved
rights are limited to the “amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no
more”).
77 See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 195 (1999) (upholding
the usufructuary rights of the Chippewa because the land cessions failed to mention, let alone
abrogate them); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 411–12 (1968)
(refusing to find abrogation of usufructuary rights in a statute that terminated the tribe).
78 Mineral County I, 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring). As discussed below,
the Nevada Supreme Court later relied on Justice Rose’s Mineral County I concurrence when the
court expressly recognized the Nevada public trust doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes
103–121.
79 On the public trust doctrine and its origins, see MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA
WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 3–
11 (3d ed. 2021).
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Lawrence v. Clark County,80 the court acknowledged and applied public
trust principles in several earlier decisions. In the early 1970s, the court
recognized state ownership of water, stating that “it is settled law in this
country that, by virtue of a state’s admission into the United States,” the
state owns those waters and the beds beneath them that were navigable at
the time of statehood.81 The court acknowledged that states “hold title to
the beds of navigable watercourses in trust for the people of their
respective states,” and that such titles are presumptively inalienable.82 In
other words, “[t]he State holds the subject lands in trust for public use.”83
The Lawrence court would later interpret these earlier decisions as
implicitly recognizing the public trust doctrine,84 although the Lawrence
court did not define the scope of the public trust res beyond navigable
waters and the lands beneath those waters (including formerly submerged
lands).85
In a 2001 Nevada Supreme Court case, Mineral County v. State of
Nevada, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (Mineral
County I),86 Justice Robert Rose penned an influential concurring
opinion, on which the Nevada Supreme Court relied twenty years later in
Mineral County v. Lyon County (Mineral County II),87 where the court
finally addressed the merits of Mineral County’s public trust claims.88 In
Mineral County I,89 the county sued Nevada’s Department of
80 254 P.3d 606, 617 (Nev. 2011). The Lawrence Court noted that “although Nevada law
embraces public trust doctrine principles, this court has never expressly adopted that doctrine.” Id.
at 611.
81 Id. at 609–10 (quoting and construing State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Nev. 1972)
(internal quotation marks omitted); State Eng’r v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 160 (Nev.
1970) (“When a territory is endowed with statehood one of the many items its sovereignty includes
is the grant from the federal government of all navigable bodies of water within the particular
territory, whether they be rivers, lakes or streams. If the body of water is classified as non-navigable
at the time of the creation of the state, the underlying land remains the property of the United States,
but if it is navigable under the definition hereinafter stated, the water and the bed beneath it becomes
the property of the state.” (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1894)).
82 Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1233–34, 1237.
83 Id. at 1238 (emphasis added).
84 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 610.
85 See generally Lawrence, 254 P.3d 606.
86 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001).
87 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020).
88 Id. at 424–29; see discussion of Mineral County II, infra Part V.
89 Mineral County I was an original writ proceeding in the Walker Basin litigation. As Mineral
County’s motion to intervene was pending in the Decree Court, see infra Part IV, the county
invoked the public trust doctrine, seeking a variety of remedies: (1) a writ of mandamus against the
State of Nevada and various state officials to prevent them from granting additional rights to
withdraw surface or groundwater from the Walker River system; and (2) a writ of mandamus
“challenging [the officials’] public trust obligations in managing and appropriating water flows into
Walker Lake.” Mineral County I, 20 P.3d at 801. Mineral County was joined by co-plaintiff Walker
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Conservation and Natural Resources and the State Engineer, claiming
that both had “abrogated their duty to protect and maintain Walker Lake
for the benefit of the public and, in doing so, ha[d] repudiated their public
trust duties.”90
The Nevada Supreme Court majority declined, on jurisdictional
grounds, to address the merits of Mineral County’s public trust claim. The
court acknowledged that the federal Decree Court held continuing and
exclusive jurisdiction over the Walker River Basin litigation, and that the
Nevada Supreme Court could, therefore, adjudicate the public trust issue
only on certification.91 Justice Robert Rose, however, issued a concurring
opinion reaching the merits of Mineral County’s claims and maintaining
that the court should nonetheless “affirmatively address the existence and
role of the public trust doctrine in the State of Nevada.”92
Justice Rose recognized that underlying the public trust doctrine were
the core principles established by the U.S. Supreme Court: that “all of a
state’s navigable waterways are held in trust by the state for the benefit
of the people,” and that “state . . . control of those waters is forever
subject to that trust.”93 Rose then explained that, although the original
purposes of the public trust involved protecting the public’s rights in
navigation, commerce, and fishing, those purposes “evolved to
encompass additional public values—including recreational and
ecological uses.”94 Because the trust res—which originally encompassed
navigable waters and the lands beneath those waters—evolved to
encompass non-navigable tributaries that feed navigable waters, in
Justice Rose’s view, an “extension of the doctrine” was “natural and

Lake Working Group, “a private, not for profit 501(c)(3) organization [whose members] use[]
Walker Lake for fishing, birding, recreation, and for the enjoyment of its scenic beauty.” Id. at 804.
As of this writing, Walker Lake Working Group has ceased its legal efforts due to lack of funding.
See WALKER LAKE WORKING GRP., http://www.walkerlake.org [https://perma.cc/GHT3-ZNEA]
(last visited Feb. 17, 2022).
90 Mineral County I, 20 P.3d at 804. Respondents also included the Director of the Department
of Conservation and Natural Resources. Id.
91 Id. at 806–07, 807 n.35. As discussed below in Part V, the court, in fact, adjudicated the public
trust issue on certification almost two decades later in Mineral County II. Had the Mineral County
I majority reached the merits, it would have addressed many of the same issues that the Ninth
Circuit certified to the Nevada court almost two decades later. See Mineral Cnty. v. Walker River
Irrigation Dist. (Walker River II), 900 F.3d 1027, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that Mineral
County had brought “essentially the same suit” in Mineral County I). Because the Mineral County
II court addressed only a single, narrow legal issue on certification, the court left key questions
unaddressed. See infra Parts V, VI, and VII.
92 Mineral County I, 20 P.3d at 807 (Rose, J., concurring). Justice Shearing joined Justice Rose’s
concurrence.
93 Id. (citing Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 452 (1892)).
94 Id.
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necessary” where—as in the case of Walker Lake—“the navigable
water’s existence is wholly dependent on tributaries that appear to be
over-appropriated.”95 Rose relied on the California Supreme Court’s
decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County
(Mono Lake), which extended the scope of the public trust beyond
navigable waters. 96
Justice Rose emphasized that both Nevada statutes and the common
law established public ownership of water in Nevada. In 1913, Nevada
Revised Statute (NRS) 533.025 announced that “[t]he water of all sources
of water supply within the boundaries of the State whether above or
beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public.”97 He explained
that in 1997 the Nevada Supreme Court recognized public ownership of
water to be the “most fundamental tenet of Nevada water law,”98 and that
owners of vested water rights “do not own or acquire title to water, but
merely enjoy a right to the beneficial use of the water.”99 He concluded
that this usufructuary right must be “forever subject to the public trust,
which at all times ‘forms the outer boundaries of permissible government
action with respect to public trust resources.’”100 In his view, consistent
with Mono Lake, the public trust doctrine “operates simultaneously” with
Nevada’s system of prior appropriation.101 The Mineral County II court
would agree. 102
Justice Rose thought the public trust doctrine should apply to water in
Nevada, just as it does in California. Quoting Mono Lake, Justice Rose
underscored the judiciary’s role in ensuring that states exercise power
over public resources, including water, consistent with public trust
principles:
“[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to
use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the

95

Id. at 807–08.
Id. (citing Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983)).
97 NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (added 1913).
98 Mineral County I, 20 P.3d at 808 (Rose, J., concurring) (quoting Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v.
State, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (Nev. 1997)).
99 Id. (Rose, J., concurring) (citing Desert Irrigation, 944 P.2d at 842).
100 Id. (quoting Kootenai Env’t All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1095
(Idaho 1983)).
101 Id.; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 726–29 (“[B]oth the public trust doctrine and the [appropriation]
water rights system embody important precepts which make the law more responsive to the diverse
needs and interests involved in the planning and allocation of water resources. To embrace one
system of thought and reject the other would lead to an unbalanced structure, one which would
either decry as a breach of trust appropriations essential to the economic development of this state,
or deny any duty to protect or even consider the values promoted by the public trust.”).
102 473 P.3d 418, 424 (Nev. 2020) (quoting with approval Justice Rose’s Mineral County I
concurrence). For discussion of Mineral County II, see infra Part V.
96
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duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage of
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right
of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that
right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.” Our dwindling
natural resources deserve no less.103

Rose maintained that the State Engineer, a public trustee, was
responsible for “continuously consider[ing] in the course of his work the
public’s interest in Nevada’s natural water resources.”104 But Rose did not
clarify whether, to what extent, or how public trust principles should
affect vested water rights previously acquired under the doctrine of prior
appropriation and long-ago settled by judicial decree.105
In Lawrence v. Clark County, a 2011 case decided ten years after
Justice Rose penned his Mineral County I concurrence, the Nevada
Supreme Court formally recognized the public trust doctrine in
Nevada. 106 In Lawrence, the court addressed the Nevada legislature’s
attempt to transfer state-owned land in the Fort Mohave Valley to Clark
County, where the land was located. 107 The Nevada State Land Registrar,
James Lawrence, had withheld from the transfer a portion of land
adjacent to the Colorado River that had formerly been submerged because
he believed the land was non-transferable under the public trust
doctrine.108 That doctrine, Lawrence asserted, required the state to hold
the beds and banks of navigable waters in trust for the public, even those
no longer submerged.109
The Lawrence court expressly recognized the public trust doctrine in
Nevada and explained the origins of the doctrine. The court rejected Clark
County’s contention that the public trust doctrine was merely a “common

103

Mineral County I, 20 P.3d at 809 (Rose, J., concurring) (quoting Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at

723).
104

Id. at 808 (Rose, J., concurring).
Justice Rose did express hope that all appropriators could be accommodated through a plan
that would “save the essentials of everyone’s water needs,” and that such a plan would manifest
through the federal court proceedings. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court only partially resolved the
public trust issues in Mineral County II when a majority of the court finally addressed the merits
of Mineral County’s public trust claims. See infra Part V.
106 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 617 (Nev. 2011). Justice Rose retired in 2007, four
years before Lawrence was decided.
107 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 608.
108 Id.
109 Id. The lower court had ruled that the disputed land was not subject to the public trust
doctrine because the land was not “within the current channel of the Colorado River.” Clark Cnty.
v. Lawrence, No. A576003, 2003 WL 26082293 (Nev. Dist. Ct. July 16, 2003). Other states, such
as Illinois, consider filled submerged lands to be subject to the public trust doctrine. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH D. KEARNEY & THOMAS W. MERRILL, LAKEFRONT: PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
IN CHICAGO 251, 276–79 (2021) (discussing the application of the public trust doctrine to filled
land on which Soldier Field was built).
105
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law remnant” that the legislature could override through the legislation,110
recognizing that, although the doctrine “has roots in the common law,” it
is distinct from traditional common law principles.111 Relying in part on
Justices Rose’s Mineral County I concurrence, the court identified three
sources of the public trust doctrine in Nevada: the state constitution, state
statutes, and the “inherent limitations” on state sovereign power as
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in its seminal 1892 decision,
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.112
The Lawrence court first examined the Nevada Constitution’s “gift
clause,” which, with limited exceptions, prohibits the gift or loan of
public funds or credit.113 The court understood the gift clause’s constraints
on legislative action, barring the state from dispersing public funds if not
for a public purpose, as upholding the same principle underlying the
public trust doctrine. Under the Nevada Constitution’s gift clause, the
legislature must act as a fiduciary for the public when disposing of public
property; similarly, the public trust doctrine requires the state to
“carefully safeguard public trust lands by dispensing them only when in
the public’s interest.”114 Because both the gift clause and the public trust
doctrine “require[] the state to serve as trustee for public resources,” the
court concluded that the gift clause implicitly “constrain[s] the
Legislature’s ability to alienate public trust lands.”115
In addition to the state constitution, the court found public trust
principles embedded in two statutory provisions that impose fiduciary
duties on the state with respect to both land and water. First, section
321.0005 of the Nevada Statutes provides that “state lands must be used
in the best interest of the residents of [Nevada].” 116 That requirement, the
court concluded, “contemplates fiduciary-type duties” concerning the
administration of state-owned lands.117 Second, the court agreed with
Justice Rose’s conclusion that section 533.025 of the Nevada Statutes,
which recognizes public ownership of all water within Nevada, “provides
grounding for the Nevada public trust doctrine.”118 The Lawrence court
110 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 611–12. See KEARNEY & MERRILL, supra note 109, at 245, 298
(discussing legislative override in Illinois).
111 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 613.
112 Id. at 613 (citing Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892)).
113 Id. at 612 (quoting NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 9) (“The State shall not donate or loan money,
or its credit, subscribe to or be, interested in the Stock of any company, association, or corporation,
except corporations formed for educational or charitable purposes.”).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. (emphasis removed) (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.0005).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 612–13 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (providing that “[t]he water of all sources
of water supply within the boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the surface of the
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understood these two provisions to codify “the fiduciary principles at the
heart of the public trust doctrine.”119
Finally, the Lawrence court held that the public trust doctrine also
arises from the “inherent limitations” on state sovereign power, as
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1892 holding in Illinois
Central:120 “The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in
which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils
under them, . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”121 As
the Lawrence court explained, Illinois Central prohibited, apparently on
the basis of inherent sovereign limits, a state legislature from disposing
of such “public trust property” when doing so would not serve the public
interest.122 The court recognized that the public trust obligation
established in Illinois Central not only restrained the alienation of trust
lands, but also, more broadly, required that a state legislature act as a
fiduciary of the public “in its administration of trust property.”123
Significantly, the Lawrence court recognized that the public trust doctrine
of Illinois Central is not simply “common law easily abrogated by
legislation”: instead, the doctrine exists as an “inseverable restraint” on
state sovereign power. 124
The Lawrence court concluded that whether the land transfer at issue
was consistent with the public trust doctrine turned on the resolution of
two questions the district court needed to address on remand. First, it was
unclear whether the state had held title to the disputed lands. The answer
ground, belongs to the public”) and citing Mineral County I, 20 P.3d 800, 808 (Nev. 2001) (Rose,
J., concurring)).
119 Id. at 613.
120 Id. (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)).
121 Id. (quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453). For a concise discussion of the facts and
holding of Illinois Central, see Michael Benjamin Smith, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine of
Illinois Central: The Misunderstood Legacy of Appleby v. City of New York, 51 ENV’T L. 515,
527–29 (2021).
122 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 613.
123 Id.
124 Id. Other courts, both state and federal, have similarly ruled that the public trust doctrine
inheres in sovereignty. See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016)
(“Public trust claims are unique because they concern inherent attributes of sovereignty. The public
trust imposes on the government an obligation to protect the res of the trust. A defining feature of
that obligation is that it cannot be legislated away.”), rev’d on standing grounds, 947 F.3d 1159
(9th Cir. 2020); In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiāhole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 442–43 (Haw.
2000) (recognizing the public trust doctrine’s “basic premise, that the state has certain powers and
duties which it cannot legislatively abdicate” (citing Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453–54));
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 946–49 (Pa. 2013) (interpreting Article I of the
Pennsylvania Constitution as recognizing preexisting “inherent and indefeasible rights” of all
citizens, part of the “inviolate” social contract that imposes on the state government a fiduciary
duty to “conserve and maintain” public natural resources for the benefit of all citizens).
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to that question hinged on whether the lands were submerged beneath a
navigable stretch of the Colorado River in 1864 when Nevada joined the
United States on an equal footing with other states, taking title to lands
under submerged waters.125 Second, if the disputed lands were public trust
lands, the district court needed to determine whether the proposed
conveyance of those lands out of state ownership contravened the public
trust doctrine.126 To resolve the second question, the Nevada Supreme
Court endorsed a three-prong test for evaluating dispensations of
navigable waterways.127 Under the framework, a court must consider “(1)
whether the dispensation was made for a public purpose, (2) whether the
state received fair consideration in exchange for the dispensation, and (3)
whether the dispensation satisfies ‘the state’s special obligation to
maintain the trust for the use and enjoyment of present and future
generations.’”128
In Walker River II (discussed in Part IV), the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the Lawrence court’s analysis had not definitively resolved Mineral
County’s public trust claims, which involved the interaction of the public
trust and prior appropriation doctrines.129 Although Lawrence formally
recognized the public trust doctrine in Nevada, the decision did not
clearly define the scope of the public trust res beyond navigable waters
and the lands beneath them. Nor did it establish whether the public trust
doctrine might permit reallocation of water rights previously settled by
judicial decree under the doctrine of prior appropriation. 130 As discussed
in Part V, the Nevada Supreme Court would address both questions in
Mineral County II.

125 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 614, 617. The district court also needed to determine whether the land
became dry through reliction (“the gradual and imperceptible exposure of the land”) or avulsion
(“sudden changes in the course of a stream”). Id. at 614. If the land became dry through reliction,
title would have passed from the state to the owners of the adjoining shorelands, but if the changes
occurred through avulsion, the state would retain title. See id. at 614–15.
126 Id. at 617.
127 The Arizona Court of Appeals in Arizona Center for Law v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 170–73
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) originally applied the test, which the Lawrence court adopted. See Lawrence,
254 P.3d at 615–16.
128 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 616 (construing and quoting Hassell, 837 P.2d at 170). Although the
first two considerations would apply to a court’s evaluation of any dispensation of public property,
the Lawrence court considered the third “specific to navigable waterways under the public trust.”
Id.
129 See Walker River II, 900 F.3d 1027, 1031–34 (9th Cir. 2018) (reviewing Lawrence and
concluding “that whether, and to what extent, the public trust doctrine applies to appropriative
rights settled under the Walker River Decree” remained “an open question”).
130 See id. at 1031–32 (evaluating Lawrence).
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IV. THE BEGINNING OF THE WALKER LAKE LITIGATION
In 1994, Mineral County, in which Walker Lake is located, moved to
intervene131 in the ongoing Decree litigation, asserting that the public trust
doctrine required a reallocation of the waters of the Walker River to
preserve Walker Lake’s resources. Declaring that “[m]inimum flowage
guaranteed to Walker Lake was not dealt with, resolved, or considered in
the original decree,” Mineral County claimed that “[w]ithout reallocation
of the waters to insure priority minimum flows to sustain the Lake,
Walker Lake, its users and the citizens of Mineral County and the public
w[ould] suffer substantial and irreparable damage.”132 The county argued
that “maintenance of the public trust” consequently required certain
minimum levels of flows to the lake and asked the Decree Court to (1)
reopen and modify the Decree, recognizing the rights of Mineral County
to have minimum lake levels necessary to sustain the lake’s naturally
occurring fish population, preserve wildlife, and support recreational,
aesthetic, and economically beneficial uses of the lake; (2) order the State
of Nevada to grant a certificate to Mineral County recognizing its right to
minimum flows of 127,000 acre-feet per year to the lake (the minimum
flows necessary to maintain the lake’s naturally occurring fish
populations); and (3) recognize that those minimum flows were “in the
public interest” and “required under the doctrine of maintenance of the
public trust.”133
In 2013, almost twenty years after Mineral County moved to intervene
in the Decree litigation, the Nevada district court finally granted the
county’s motion.134 Two years later, in United States v. Walker River
Irrigation District (Walker River I), 135 the court dismissed Mineral
County’s complaint on multiple grounds.136 The Decree Court first ruled
131 Notice of Motion and Motion of Mineral County of Nevada for Intervention, United States
v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. 3:73-cv-00127-MMD-WGC (In Equity No. C-125-B) (D.
Nev. Oct. 25, 1994).
132 Mineral County’s Amended Complaint in Intervention at 4, United States v. Walker River
Irrigation Dist. (Walker River I), No. 3:73-cv-00128-RCJ-WGC (In Equity No. C-125-C) (D. Nev.,
Mar. 10, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Amended Complaint].
133 Id. at 4–6.
134 Minutes of Proceedings, Walker River I, No. 3:73-cv-00128 (In Equity No. C-125-C) (D.
Nev. Sept. 23, 2013), ECF No. 726. Litigation at the Decree Court could not proceed until hundreds
of potential upstream water rights holders had been served. See Mineral County I, 20 P.3d 800, 804
(Nev. 2001).
135 Walker River I, No. 3:73-cv-00128 (In Equity No. C-125-C) 2015 WL 3439122 (D. Nev.
May 28, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part by Walker River III, 986 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2021).
As discussed below, the Ninth Circuit overruled the Walker River I court in three separate rulings.
See infra text accompanying notes 141–153.
136 See id. at *10–11. The district court’s ruling followed a motion to dismiss the county’s
Amended Complaint in Intervention made by the Walker River Irrigation District, a party to the
ongoing Decree litigation. Id. at *4.
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that Mineral County had no standing to assert the public trust doctrine,
reasoning that municipalities, which are not sovereigns, cannot sue to
vindicate the public trust under the doctrine of parens patriae.137 The
court also decided that even if Mineral County did have standing to assert
a public trust claim, the public trust doctrine could only factor into future
allocations of water.138 According to the court, any retroactive
reallocation of water rights previously adjudicated under the doctrine of
prior appropriation would amount to a taking requiring just compensation
under either the federal or state constitutions, and the political question
doctrine barred the court from effectuating such a taking. 139 Finally, the
court held that Walker Lake is not within the “basin of Walker River”
within the meaning of the 1936 Decree, thereby barring the intentional
delivery of waters of the basin into Walker Lake, beyond those flowing
naturally into the river.140
In 2018, the Ninth Circuit overruled each of Walker River I’s
conclusions.141 First, the court of appeals decided that the district court
erred in dismissing Mineral County’s complaint for lack of standing,
holding that a political subdivision may sue to vindicate its own interest
and that Mineral County satisfied Article III standing requirements. 142
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the merits of Mineral County’s public
trust claim, reasoning that whether the 1936 Decree could be amended
“to allow for certain minimum flows of water to reach Walker Lake”
depended on whether Nevada’s public trust doctrine might apply to those
water rights “previously adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of
prior appropriation.”143

137 Id. at *3–4. The court concluded, however, that the State of Nevada or any of its citizens
would have standing to bring a public trust claim. Id. at *4.
138 Id. at *9. In Mineral County II, the Nevada Supreme Court agreed that Nevada’s public trust
doctrine would not permit reallocation of adjudicated rights. See infra text accompanying notes
156–158.
139 Id. at *6–9. The Walker River I court’s merits ruling rested in part on the court’s
determination that the scope of the public trust res in Nevada did not extend to non-navigable
waters. Id. at *6. The Nevada Supreme Court subsequently held otherwise in Mineral County II,
when the court clarified that the public trust res in Nevada extends to all waters in the state,
“whether navigable or nonnavigable.” 473 P.3d 418, 425–26, 425 n.4 (Nev. 2020).
140 Walker River I, 2015 WL 3439122, at *10.
141 In a fourth ruling, the Ninth Circuit took the “rare and extraordinary” step of reassigning all
Walker Basin litigation to a different judge, due to the then-current district court judge’s
demonstrated hostility toward federal attorneys. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 890
F.3d 1161, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2018).
142 Mono Cnty. v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 735 F. App’x 271, 273–74 (9th Cir. 2018). The
Ninth Circuit also concluded that Walker Lake is in fact within Walker Basin. United States v. U.S.
Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 893 F.3d 578, 604–06 (9th Cir. 2018).
143 Walker River II, 900 F.3d 1027, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2018).
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On the latter issue, the Ninth Circuit determined that neither
appellants’ nor appellees’ arguments were convincing. The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged “general principles” suggesting that Nevada’s public trust
doctrine “applies to Walker Lake in some form,” but concluded that
Mineral County had not conclusively established that the public trust
doctrine held “absolute supremacy” over the doctrine of prior
appropriation.144 Lyon County—an upstream Nevada county opposing
Mineral County’s claim145—argued that water rights adjudicated and
settled by judicial decree were vested, and, therefore, “no longer within
the purview of the public trust doctrine.”146
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the doctrine of prior appropriation was
“largely a product of the compelling need for certainty”147 and that
“principles of finality” are “encapsulated in Nevada’s statutes.”148 But the
court also acknowledged the existence of “significant authority,”
including Justice Rose’s Mineral County I concurrence, which had
suggested that previously adjudicated rights might still be subject to the
public trust doctrine.149 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
“whether, and to what extent, the public trust doctrine applies to
144 Id. at 1032. The Ninth Circuit understood Mineral County to assert that the public trust
doctrine required the State Engineer to “reconsider previous allocations.” Id. The county, however,
had explained that it “does not seek a water right for Walker Lake,” and that the public trust doctrine
would not operate as “creating a water right”; instead, the county argued that the public trust
doctrine required the state and the Decree Court to “affirmatively manage and regulate” flows to
Walker Lake to “protect and maintain” the lake as a public trust resource. Mineral County’s
Response to Motions to Dismiss Concerning Threshold Jurisdictional Issues, Ex. 1, at 13–14,
Walker River II, 900 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-16342).
145 On the public trust issue, the court addressed the arguments of Lyon County and not the
named appellee (Walker River Irrigation District) because the latter argued in favor of certifying
the public trust question to the Nevada Supreme Court. See Brief of Appellee Walker River
Irrigation District at 45–49, Walker River II, 900 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-16342), 2016
WL 4528234 (arguing for certification). An attorney representing Lyon County and several
California water users argued on the merits of Mineral County’s public trust claim before the Ninth
Circuit. Oral Argument (unofficial transcript), Walker River II, 900 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (No.
15-16342), 2017 WL 9476965.
146 Walker River II, 900 F.3d at 1032.
147 Id. at 1033 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983)).
148 Id.
149 Id. The court considered the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding that “the most fundamental
tenet of Nevada water law [is that] ‘the water of all sources of water supply . . . belongs to the
public,’” and that “even those holding . . . vested . . . water rights do not own or acquire title to
water,” Id. (quoting Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (Nev. 1997) (quoting with
emphasis NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025)); and Justice Rose’s conclusion in his Mineral County I
concurrence that even “those holding vested water rights” hold those rights “forever subject to the
public trust.” Id. (quoting Mineral County I, 20 P.3d 800, 808 (Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Ninth Circuit also looked to the California Supreme
Court’s opinion in Mono Lake, where the court balanced the competing values underlying the
public trust and prior appropriations doctrines. Id. at 1033–34 (evaluating Mono Lake, 658 P.2d
709, 712 (Cal. 1983)).
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appropriative rights settled under the [1936] Decree” remained “an open
question.”150 Since the court remained uncertain as to how the Nevada
Supreme Court would resolve the issue,151 the Ninth Circuit certified the
following two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court:
[1] Does the public trust doctrine apply to rights already
adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation
and, if so, to what extent?
[2] If the public trust doctrine applies and allows for reallocation
of rights settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation, does
the abrogation of such adjudicated or vested rights constitute a
“taking” under the Nevada Constitution requiring payment of just
compensation?152

As discussed below, the Nevada Supreme Court rephrased and
narrowed the first question, and in answering that first question in the
negative, never reached the second. 153
V. THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
MINERAL COUNTY V. LYON COUNTY
In Mineral County v. Lyon County (Mineral County II), the Nevada
Supreme Court “rephrased”154 the first question that the Ninth Circuit had
certified: whether “the public trust doctrine appl[ies] to rights already
adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation and, if

150

Walker River II, 900 F.3d at 1034.
The Walker River II court also understood Mineral County I as “effectively invit[ing] the
federal court to certify the public trust question.” Id. at 1031 (construing Mineral County I, 20 P.3d
800, 807 n.35 (Nev. 2001)).
152 Id. at 1034.
153 Considering the Mineral County II court’s conclusion that “the doctrine has always inhered
in the water law of Nevada as a qualification or constraint in every appropriated right,” 473 P.3d
418, 425 (Nev. 2020), it seems unlikely that any reallocation required by the public trust doctrine
would constitute a taking. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992)
(explaining that no taking occurs where state regulation is grounded in “background principles” of
property law); Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e look to state law to
determine what property rights exist and therefore are subject to ‘taking’ under the Fifth
Amendment.”). In Mono Lake, the California Supreme Court ruled that appropriative water rights
were subject to the public trust and thus opened the door to potential “revocation of previously
granted [allocated] rights”; the court also emphasized that it had consistently “rejected the claim
that establishment of the public trust constituted a taking of property for which compensation was
required.” 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1983); see also id. (“We do not divest anyone of title to property;
the consequence of our decision will be only that some landowners whose predecessors in interest
acquired property under the 1870 act will . . . hold it subject to the public trust.” (quoting City of
Berkeley v. Super. Ct., 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980)). For a discussion of background principles
serving as a government defense to takings claims, see Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard,
Revisiting Background Principles in Takings Litigation, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1165 (2019).
154 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418, 421 (Nev. 2020).
151
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so, to what extent.”155 Believing that the Walker River Basin could not
meet the lake’s needs “without abrogating the rights of more senior rights
holders,”156 the court asked only whether Nevada’s public trust doctrine
“permits reallocating water rights previously settled under Nevada’s
prior appropriation doctrine.”157 Although Mineral County II rejected
reallocating adjudicated rights,158 the court significantly expanded the
scope of Nevada’s public trust doctrine by including all waters and water
rights as trust resources.159 Moreover, given the narrow nature of the
majority decision in the case, the court left substantial room for the
Decree Court to provide meaningful public trust relief to Walker Lake.160

155

Walker River II, 900 F.3d at 1034 (emphasis added).
Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 430 n.8. The court’s assumption that the only relevant
question was whether the public trust doctrine permits reallocation of previously adjudicated rights
was not without basis. In Mineral County’s first amended complaint, filed in 1995, the county
expressly sought an “adjudication and reallocation of the waters of Walker River to preserve the
minimum levels in Walker Lake, as a condition to the water rights licenses of all upstream users.”
1995 Amended Complaint, supra note 132, at 4. The Ninth Circuit had also appeared to assume
that granting relief to Mineral County would require a reallocation of adjudicated rights. See Walker
River II, 900 F.3d at 1030–31 (“The remaining issue—whether the Walker River Decree can be
amended to allow for certain minimum flows of water to reach Walker Lake—depends on whether
the public trust doctrine applies to rights previously adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of
prior appropriation and permits alteration of prior allocations.” (emphasis added)). As noted
above, however, the county had begun to characterize its requested relief in terms of
“manage[ment] and regulat[ion]”—and the county emphasized that it “does not seek a water right
for Walker Lake.” See Mineral County’s Response to Motions to Dismiss Concerning Threshold
Jurisdictional Issues, Ex. 1, at 13–14, Walker River II, 900 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 1516342); see also discussion infra note 144. In its 2016 briefing at the Ninth Circuit, the county
asserted, “Mineral County’s claim does not contemplate a reallocation of or change in priority of
water rights. Rather, recognition of the public trust duty to preserve minimum flows to Walker Lake
would affect the amount of water available for use by water rights holders just as drought might
have an impact on availability of water.” Reply Brief of Appellants Mineral County and Walker
Lake Working Group at 12, Walker River II, 900 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-16342).
157 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 421.
158 Id. at 431. In this respect, Mineral County II stands in sharp contrast to Mono Lake. Although
the Mono Lake court did not extend the trust res as far as the Nevada Supreme Court did in Mineral
County II, the California Supreme Court recognized a more robust public trust doctrine with respect
to settled appropriation rights. The Mono Lake court concluded that the state, acting as
administrator of a public trust that “imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and
use of the appropriated water,” had the power to revoke previously granted rights. Mono Lake, 658
P.2d 709, 723, 728 (Cal. 1983). Recognizing that “no responsible body” had specifically considered
the effect of the appropriations at issue, which diverted the “entire flow” of Mono Lake’s tributaries
into the Los Angeles Aqueduct, the California Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine
required that “some responsible body”—the California courts or the state water board—
“reconsider” prior allocations of Mono Basin’s waters. Id. at 728–29. That “reconsideration and
reallocation” needed to account for the adverse effects of upstream diversions on the Mono Lake
environment. Id. at 729.
159 See infra text accompanying notes 161–168.
160 See infra notes 169–182 and accompanying text.
156
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After an historical review of the public trust doctrine,161 the Mineral
County II court endorsed Justice Rose’s Mineral County I concurrence,
announcing that Nevada’s public trust doctrine “applies to [water] rights
already adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation,
such that the doctrine has always inhered in the water law of Nevada as
a qualification or constraint in every appropriated right.”162 Relying on
Justice Rose, the court “clarif[ied]” that the public trust res in Nevada
extends to all waters in the state, “whether navigable or nonnavigable,”163
thereby expanding the scope of the public trust in Nevada beyond the
bounds of navigable waters to include non-navigable tributaries,
ephemeral streams, wetlands, and groundwater. Mineral County II thus
represents a pathbreaking, express expansion of the scope of the public
trust doctrine in Nevada: 164 where the Lawrence court had confirmed that
the trust res extended to navigable waters and submerged (or formerly
submerged) lands, 165 the Mineral County II court held that the public trust
doctrine not only applied to all waters within the state, but also inhered
as a “qualification or constraint in every appropriated water right.” 166 In
so holding, the Mineral County II court expanded the scope of the Nevada
public trust doctrine considerably beyond that of the California public
trust doctrine as articulated in Mono Lake, in which the California
Supreme Court expanded the doctrine’s reach only to non-navigable
tributaries that feed navigable waters.167 Mineral County II extended the
doctrine’s reach to all waters—even isolated wetlands and groundwater
unconnected to navigable waters.168
Although the court eschewed reallocation of water rights, it
nonetheless recognized that water rights in Nevada “are subject to
regulation for the public welfare.”169 The court did not, however, specify
the sorts of potential ‘regulatory’ relief remaining to Mineral County.
One potential remedy if the public trust inheres in all waters and in every
161

Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 423–25.
Id. at 424-25 (emphasis added).
163 Id. at 425–26.
164 As the dissent noted, the majority’s holding on the scope of the public trust res was more
than a “clarification”: although a majority of the court had never expressly held otherwise, the
majority’s ruling “mark[ed] a significant expansion of the public trust doctrine.” Id. at 433
(Pickering, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165 See discussion supra Part III.
166 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 425.
167 Mono Lake, P.2d 709, 721, 721 n.19 (Cal. 1983) (holding that “the public trust doctrine, as
recognized and developed in California decisions, protects navigable waters from harm caused by
diversion of nonnavigable tributaries,” but expressly not considering whether the doctrine’s
protections otherwise extended to nonnavigable streams (footnotes omitted)).
168 See Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 425; id. at 433 (Pickering, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
169 Id. at 426; id. at 430 (Pickering, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162
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water right is to conclude that water rights that unnecessarily damage
trust resources are equivalent to wasting water, which no water right
holder may do.170
In her Mineral County II dissent, 171 Chief Justice Pickering sharply
criticized the majority for rephrasing and narrowing the first question the
Ninth Circuit had certified, such that the court only considered whether
Nevada’s public trust doctrine would permit reallocation of adjudicated
rights.172 Importantly, although the county originally framed potential
relief primarily in terms of “reallocation,”173 by the time the case reached
the Nevada Supreme Court the county had shifted that framing, 174
maintaining that “the reallocation of water rights, adjudicated or
permitted, is not truly an issue in this case.”175 Instead of seeking the
creation of a new, senior water right with “greater priority,” the county
argued that the public trust doctrine should act “as a constraint on the
availability of water for appropriation from the public trust water
resource” of Walker River Basin.176 The Mineral County II majority
seemed to agree in its admonition that all water rights are subject to public
welfare regulation.177
The county maintained that vested appropriative water rights are not
absolute and do not guarantee a specific quantity of water. Instead, they
argued that appropriative rights involve “quantitative shares of each
claimant, in relation to each other” of the total water quantity available
for appropriation.178 Thus, any reduction in the availability of water

170 See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 533.460, 533.463 (establishing unlawfulness of waste). In postMineral County II briefing, the county enumerated several remedies targeting waste of water by
upstream appropriators. See 2021 Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 7–9.
171 Chief Justice Pickering concurred in part and dissented in part, although the points of
agreement—involving the court’s recognition of Nevada’s public trust doctrine, as articulated in
Lawrence and in Justice Rose’s Mineral County I concurrence—were narrow. See Mineral County
II, 473 P.3d at 432–33 (Pickering, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172 Id. at 431–32 (Pickering, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173 See supra note 156.
174 In its 2016 briefing at the Ninth Circuit, the county asserted that “Mineral County’s claim
does not contemplate a reallocation of or change in priority of water rights. Rather, recognition of
the public trust duty to preserve minimum flows to Walker Lake would affect the amount of water
available for use by water rights holders just as drought might have an impact on availability of
water.” Reply Brief of Appellants Mineral County and Walker Lake Working Group at 12, Walker
River II, 900 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-16342). The County echoed this assertion in its
subsequent briefing to the Nevada Supreme Court. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 14, Mineral County
II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 75917).
175 Appellants’ Reply Brief at 14, Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 75917).
176 Id. at 7.
177 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 430.
178 Appellants’ Opening Brief at 25, Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 75917).
Mineral County also relied on Basey v. Gallagher, in which the U.S. Supreme Court had recognized
that appropriation water rights are “not unrestricted” but “must be exercised with reference to the
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resulting from enforcement of the public trust doctrine “would be like any
other natural constraint on the already variable availability of water to
supply private appropriations and would not constitute a modification of
water rights.”179 Maintaining that the public trust doctrine requires a
change in how the Walker River system is managed, so that Walker Lake
might be restored “to a reasonable state of health and functionality in
terms of its trust uses and values,” Mineral County suggested a number
of remedial measures short of water rights reallocation that the Nevada
Supreme Court failed to address.180 Among these were changes in how
surplus water is managed in wet years and how flows are managed
outside the irrigation season. The county’s suggested measures included
requiring efficiency improvements, requiring the state to create a public
trust plan for the lake, and getting water rights holders to develop
consumptive use reduction plans 181—methods similar to those adopted in
the over-appropriated Diamond Valley Hydrologic Basin.182

general condition of the country and the necessities of the people.” Id. at 23 (quoting 87 U.S. 670,
683 (1874)).
179 Appellants’ Reply Brief at 18, Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 75917).
180 Id. at 18. Mineral County has expanded and refined its request for potential remedies. See
discussion infra Part VII.
181 Appellants’ Reply Brief at 18, Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418 (“Such an order might
involve, without limitation: (1) a change in how surplus waters are managed in wet years and how
flows outside of the irrigation season are managed; (2) mandating efficiency improvements with a
requirement that water saved thereby be released to the Lake; (3) curtailment of the most
speculative junior rights on the system; (4) a mandate that the State provide both a plan for fulfilling
its public trust duty to Walker Lake and the funding necessary to effectuate that plan; and/or (5) an
order requiring water rights holders to come up with a plan to reduce consumptive water use in the
Basin as was done by the [State Engineer] in Diamond Valley.”).
182 Nevada law authorizes the State Engineer to “designate as a critical management area any
basin in which withdrawals of groundwater consistently exceed the perennial yield of the basin,”
and to regulate that basin as appropriate “for the welfare of the area involved,” including
designating preferred uses within that basin. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 534.110, 534.120. Nevada law
also grants to groundwater rights holders in a critical management area the right to petition the State
Engineer to adopt a groundwater management plan, proposed by the stakeholders, that “set[s] forth
the necessary steps for removal of the basin’s designation as a critical management area.” Id.
§ 534.037. In 2015, the State Engineer designated the Diamond Valley Hydrologic Basin as a
critical management area, and in 2019 granted Diamond Valley groundwater rights holders’
petition to adopt a proposed plan. Off. of the State Eng’r, State of Nev., Order Granting Petition to
Adopt a Groundwater Management Plan for the Diamond Valley Hydrologic Basin (07-153),
Eureka County, State of Nevada, Order No. 1302 (Jan. 11, 2019).
Although Nevada’s water statutes expressly grant the State Engineer the above authority
concerning over-appropriated groundwater, the statutes provide no similar express authorization in
the surface water rights context. Mineral County has asserted that there exists an implicit analogous
authority to administer surface water rights and to curtail by priority when circumstances so
require—for example, when the public trust water resource is being unreasonably harmed—and to
direct water rights holders to develop a plan to reduce consumptive use as an alternative if they
wish to avoid curtailment. See supra note 181.
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Because the Mineral County II court addressed only the narrow
question of reallocation, it never assessed the viability of these alternative
forms of relief. The dissent, criticizing the majority for rephrasing the
Ninth Circuit’s question, contended that none of the remedial measures
Mineral County had suggested required a reallocation. 183 Echoing the
County’s assertions as to the relative nature of appropriative rights, the
dissent noted that “[e]ven the vested water rights at issue are only worth
the maximum amount of water available for allocation in the Basin.”184
Citing Mono Lake, the dissent concluded that potentially limiting the
availability of water through enforcement of the public trust would not,
in fact, “effect a reallocation of vested water rights.”185 Instead, the dissent
believed, it would only reduce the amount of water “available for
allocation.”186
Because the majority only addressed the reallocation issue, it never
discussed the viability of other forms of relief. Therefore, much of the
dissent’s analysis became relevant to the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent
determination of whether those alternative forms of relief remained
available. As the Ninth Circuit confirmed, Mineral County II supports the
county’s claim that the state and decree court, under the public trust
doctrine, have a trust duty to protect the precarious resource of Walker
Lake.187
VI. THE DOOR TO RELIEF: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S SUSTAINING OF
MINERAL COUNTY’S CLAIM
When the Walker River litigation continued in the Ninth Circuit
following the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Mineral County II, the
county raised two key issues. First, the county argued that the court of
appeals should remand the case to the Decree Court to determine whether
the 1936 Decree itself violated the public trust doctrine because the
Nevada Supreme Court had “made no finding as to whether adequate
consideration of the public trust occurred in the individual allocative

183 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 432 (Pickering, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Chief Justice Pickering also concluded that none of these remedial measures would
“imping[e] on principles of finality.” Id. at 436 (emphasis removed).
184 Id. at 437.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 As Mineral County explained, the Decree Court “stands in the shoes of the State Engineer,
because the court took jurisdiction over the Walker River system.” Supplemental Brief of
Appellants Mineral County and Walker Lake Working Group at 8, Walker River III, 986 F.3d 1197
(9th Cir. 2021) (No. 15-16342).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3917279

2022]

Walker Lake and the Public Trust in Nevada's Waters

33

decisions of the [1936] Decree.”188 Second, the county maintained that its
public trust claim remained viable because the Mineral County II court
left open the possibility of remedies other than reallocation of adjudicated
rights.189 In support of its second argument, Mineral County focused on
the narrowness of Mineral County II court’s holding, pointing to the
court’s acknowledgement that appropriative water rights “are subject to
regulation for the public welfare.”190
Although the Ninth Circuit rejected Mineral County’s argument that
the Decree Court should determine whether the 1936 Decree violated the
public trust doctrine,191 the court agreed with the county that its public
trust claim remained viable because it “c[ould] seek remedies that would
not involve a reallocation of adjudicated water rights.”192 On this point,
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Mineral County II dissent: the Nevada
Supreme Court never ruled on whether those other remedies were
available, although the state court did make clear that adjudicated water
rights were subject to state regulation.193 Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit
noted, the Mineral County II court “squarely held that ‘[t]he public trust
doctrine applies to rights already adjudicated and settled under the

188 Id. at 14. Mineral County noted that the 1936 Decree occurred long before the Nevada
Supreme Court’s Lawrence decision, in which that court adopted the three-part test for determining
whether an alienation of a trust resource satisfies the public trust doctrine. Id. at 9–13.
189 Id. at 20–26.
190 Id. at 15.
191 Such a challenge, the Ninth Circuit concluded, would violate the “‘finality in water rights’
that Nevada’s water statutes,” as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, “deem important.”
Walker River III, 986 F.3d at 1204. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the county’s challenge to the 1936
Decree itself, brought over eighty years after the decree became final, was untimely. Id.
In concluding that the public trust doctrine did not permit water rights reallocation, the Mineral
County II court looked to state law, emphasizing that Nevada’s water law “recognize[s] the
importance of finality in water rights.” 473 P.3d at 429. The court interpreted Nevada’s water
statutes to prohibit reallocation of adjudicated rights, except where water rights were lost “pursuant
to an express statutory provision.” Id. The court considered state statutory law binding, declaring
that “[w]e cannot read into the statutes any authority to permit reallocation when the Legislature
has already declared that adjudicated water rights are final, nor can we substitute our own policy
judgments for the Legislature’s.” Id. at 430. Looking to U.S. Supreme Court cases, such as Arizona
v. California, which recognized the “compelling need for certainty” in adjudicated water rights—a
need with particular importance in arid western states like Nevada, id. at 429 (quoting Arizona v.
California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983))—the Nevada court concluded that the public’s highest
interest was in certainty and finality, vital to long-term planning for municipalities and state
agricultural and mining industries, thus affecting the “prosperity of the state.” Id. Mineral County
II can thus be understood as ruling that in Nevada, the public’s interest in finality takes priority
over any benefit that might accrue from a reallocation of adjudicated rights.
192 Walker River III, 986 F.3d at 1204.
193 Id. at 1205; Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 431–32 (Pickering, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). As noted above, although the Mineral County II court never reached the issue
of relief other than reallocation, the court did recognize that “water rights are subject to regulation
for the public welfare.” 473 P.3d at 430.
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doctrine of prior appropriation.’”194 The Ninth Circuit consequently
remanded the case to the Decree Court for Mineral County to pursue
remedies other than reallocation of adjudicated rights.
VII. ARGUMENTS ON REMAND TO THE DECREE COURT
The Mineral County II majority focused on the specific relief the
county originally sought—an annual allocation of minimum flows of
127,000 acre-feet per year—and concluded that Walker Basin could only
“meet the county’s needs” through reallocation of adjudicated rights.195
By 2019, however, the Walker Basin Conservancy, with funds from the
Walker Basin Restoration Program established by Congress in 2009,196
had purchased almost half of the water rights necessary to restore the
lake.197 In addition, recent hydrologic studies of Walker Lake revealed
that some—although certainly not all—of the increased annual inflows
required to restore the lake occurred through surface and subsurface flows
and precipitation.198 In 2020, Mineral County, therefore, could maintain
194 Walker River III, 986 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 425). The liberal
pleading standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure helped keep the county’s case alive.
The upstream defendants seized on language in the county’s 1995 original amended complaint, in
which the county had expressly sought the remedy of reallocation. See Supplemental Brief of
Appellee Walker River Irrigation District at 9–10, Walker River III, 986 F.3d 1197 (No. 15-16342).
The Walker River Irrigation Group argued that “[a]fter over 25 years, Mineral County should not
be allowed to change its position” by seeking a different form of relief. Id. at 12. And Lyon County,
along with several holders of Walker River water rights, further asserted that any relief that would
reduce the amount of water available to current water rights holders would necessarily involve the
sort of reallocation that the Nevada Supreme Court had ruled impermissible. Supplemental Brief
of Defendants Lyon County, et al. at 3–4, 3 n.3, Walker River III, 986 F.3d 1197 (No. 15-16342)
[hereinafter Lyon County Brief].
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected those arguments, holding that “the county’s complaint is
broad enough to encompass the remedies it now seeks, and, even if that were not the case, the
liberal policies” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “permit the demand to be amended either
before or during trial.” Walker River III, 986 F.3d at 1205 (quoting 5 ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1255 (3d ed. 2020) (quotation marks omitted and quotation
normalized) (construing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a), 15(b)). Moreover, the court noted, Rule 54(c)
permits district courts “to grant any relief to which the evidence shows a party is entitled, even
though that party has failed to request the appropriate remedy or remedies in [its] pleading.” Id. at
1206 (quoting 5 ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1255 (3d ed.
2020). It is worth noting that the county’s first amended complaint also asked for “such other and
further relief as [the court] deems proper,” 1995 Amended Complaint, supra note 132, at 6—a
detail the defendants failed to address in their Walker River III briefing.
195 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418, 430 n.8 (Nev. 2020) (referencing 1995 Amended
Complaint, supra note 132, at 5–6).
196 See Water Conservation, WALKER BASIN CONSERVANCY, supra note 1 (discussing the Act
of Oct. 28, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-85, §§ 207–208, 123 Stat. 2845, 2858–60 (2009) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 3839bb-6)).
197 See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 2, Mineral County II, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020) (No. 75917).
198 Supplemental Brief of Appellants Mineral County and Walker Lake Working Group at 23,
Walker River III, 986 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2021) (No. 15-16342). As Mineral County explained,
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that there was “only a relatively modest need for additional increases to
inflows from the Walker River system to the Lake”—increases
achievable entirely through changes to the “management regime”
established by the 1936 Decree.199
After the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the Decree Court, Mineral
County amended its complaint, expanding potential remedies to over
twenty specific forms of regulatory and administrative relief. 200 These
remedies include (1) securing a judgment from the court amending the
rules and regulations created by the U.S. Board of Water
Commissioners,201 thereby reducing the overall quantity of water
available for diversion and increasing the annual flows reaching the
lake;202 (2) amending those rules to require that excess water in wet years
be delivered to the lake rather than apportioned among existing water
rights holders;203 (3) canceling unperfected permits, declaring water rights
that have not been put to use as abandoned, and allowing the abandoned
water to flow into Walker Lake; 204 (4) calling upon the State of Nevada
to provide funding for efficiency improvements to farm irrigation
delivery systems;205 (5) requiring the state to develop and fund the
implementation of a plan for preserving the lake; 206 (6) requiring the
Board of Water Commissioners to monitor appropriators for
unreasonable use and waste of water and to impose penalties
accordingly;207 (7) mandating increased transparency in the management
of the Walker River system, including real-time monitoring of
diversions;208 and (8) altering the makeup of the U.S. Board of Water

despite these natural flows and the Walker Basin Conservancy’s water rights acquisition program,
“There remains a need for other measures to provide additional flows of water from the Walker
River system into Walker Lake to restore the Lake’s fishery and its other public trust values. 2021
Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 6.
199 Supplemental Brief of Appellants Mineral County and Walker Lake Working Group at 24,
Walker River III, 986 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2021) (No. 15-16342).
200 2021 Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 8–11.
201 The 1936 Decree granted the board authority to enact, “with the approval of the [Decree]
Court, . . . such rules as may be necessary” to enforce the Decree and carry out its “purposes and
objects and the proper apportionment and distribution, . . . of the waters of [the] Walker River . . .
, including water for storage and stored water.” United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No.
C-125, Final Decree, 76–77 (D. Nev. Apr., 1936), amended by Order for Amendment, supra note
66, at 2–3.
202 2021 Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 8.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 9.
205 Id. at 9–10.
206 Id. at 10.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 11.
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Commissioners to ensure that interests of Mineral County and the public
are adequately represented. 209
Mineral County’s amended complaint largely eschewed language
suggesting that the county sought a superior appropriative water right. In
its complaint filed twenty-six years prior, the county had sought a specific
“minimum flow[]” that would reach Walker Lake annually.210 In contrast,
Mineral County now framed its quantitative objective entirely in terms of
preserving a specific lake level (or corresponding lake salinity level)
adequate to sustain “a healthy put-grow-and-take Lahontan cutthroat
trout fishery” and preserve the “economic, environmental, recreational,
aesthetic, and wildlife habitat values” of the lake.211
CONCLUSION
Mineral County II represents a pathbreaking expansion of the public
trust doctrine to include all waterbodies, including vested water rights,
even if the decision provided no immediate relief to Walker Lake.
Affirming the court’s earlier holding in Lawrence, the Mineral County II
court recognized that the state’s declaration of the public’s ownership of

209

Id.
See 1995 Amended Complaint, supra note 132, at 4–5 (seeking “[t]he right to, at least,
127,000 acre feet of flows annually reserved from the Walker River that will reach Walker Lake.”).
Mineral County had also sought a declaratory judgment that a specific lake level was “necessary to
maintain the viability of Walker Lake as a body of water to sustain its naturally occurring fish
population and for recreational benefits, wildlife preservation, [and] aesthetic and economic
benefits.” Id. at 5.
211 2021 Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 4–5, 7–8. The County asserted that the minimal
lake level that will sustain a “reasonably healthy” fishery is 3,965 feet above sea level, id. at 7—
just fifteen feet above the lake’s 1993 level, see 1995 Amended Complaint, supra note 132, at 3.
The corresponding salinity level, 10,000 milligrams per liter, is four times the lakes 1882 level.
2021 Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 5 (citing National Water Information System: Web
Interface,
U.S.
GEOLOGICAL
SURV.,
https://nwis.waterdata.usgs.gov/
usa/nwis/qwdata/?site_no=384200118431901 [https://perma.cc/KL3G-N7R2]).
Several upstream appropriators asserted in Walker River III that any regulatory remedy reducing
the total amount of water available to current water rights holders and increasing flows to Walker
Lake would be equivalent to granting the county a superior water right—in other words, the sort of
reallocation that the Mineral County II court had ruled impermissible. See Lyon County Brief,
supra note 194, at 3–4; id. at 3 n.3. But even if the county sought an order from the court that would
directly reduce the amount of water available to upstream appropriators, that remedy would be of
a different nature than an allocated right. Whereas an allocated right under the doctrine of prior
appropriation involves a specific quantity of water that will be deemed abandoned if not
consistently used, the quantity of water required to sustain a “reasonably healthy” Lahontan trout
fishery in Walker Lake would necessarily vary from year to year. Once the lake reached an
acceptable level, for example, the amount of water that would be needed each year—if any—to
maintain the lake would depend on several factors (e.g., precipitation, groundwater flows,
evaporative loss, and any excess flows from preceding wet years).
210
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water exemplified the public’s vital interest in water. 212 The Lawrence
court found public trust principles embedded in the state’s constitution
and statutes to be inherent limitations on state sovereign power.213 In
Mineral County II, the court announced that the public trust obligation
inheres in all water rights, some of which antedate any legislative
recognition of private water rights.214 The upshot of this recognition is
that a water right in Nevada is never fully privatized. In California,215
there are no vested water rights in Nevada against the public trust
doctrine, which is inherent in the state’s sovereignty.216 That means that
the doctrine cannot be renounced by the state legislature or state
governors. As the Supreme Court instructed in Illinois Central, the state
can no more abandon the public trust than it can abandon the state’s police
power.217
The Mineral County II decision, however, did not provide a direct or
immediate path to the lake’s restoration. The court concluded that even
an expansive public trust applying to all waters and water rights in the
state could not disturb the Nevada legislature’s policy of finality of water
rights. Therefore, the public trust doctrine cannot require reallocation of
settled water rights.218 Moreover, because it resolved only the narrow
legal question of whether the public trust doctrine might permit

212 473 P.3d 418, 425 (Nev. 2020) (reviewing Lawrence, 254 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2011)). See
discussion supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
213 254 P.3d at 612–13. See supra text accompanying notes 110–124.
214 473 P.3d at 425. See supra text accompanying notes 161–168.
215 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983) (“The state as sovereign retains continuing
supervisory control over its navigable waters and the lands beneath those waters. This principle,
fundamental to the concept of the public trust, applies to rights in flowing waters as well as to rights
in tidelands and lakeshores; it prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water
in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust.”). The Mineral County II court
diverged from the Mono Lake court in one key respect: the Nevada Supreme Court held that the
public trust doctrine would not permit reallocation of water rights settled under the doctrine of prior
appropriation. Compare Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 430 (holding that the court lacked authority
to permit reallocation), with Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 729, 732 (holding that “plaintiffs can rely on
the public trust doctrine in seeking reconsideration of the allocation of the waters of the Mono
Basin,” and that “no vested [water] rights” bar reconsideration and reallocation of those rights). In
his Mineral County I concurrence, Justice Rose extensively quoted and cited Mono Lake, and the
Mineral County II court favorably cited that concurrence. Mineral County I, 20 P.3d 800, 807–09
(Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring) (citing and quoting Mono Lake); Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at
424 (citing and quoting Justice Rose’s Mineral County I concurrence).
216 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 425; Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 613. As noted above, Nevada
joined several jurisdictions in recognizing that the public trust obligation inheres in sovereignty.
See supra note 124.
217 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The State can no more abdicate its trust over
property in . . . navigable waters and soils under them, . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in
the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”).
218 Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 430; see discussion supra note 191.
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reallocation, the court never clarified what the inherent public trust in
water rights means for Walker Lake going forward. 219
Because the trust means that, short of reallocation, water rights are not
vested against the sovereign’s duty to regulate them in the public interest,
the Nevada Supreme Court should have instructed the Decree Court and
the State Engineer that Nevada’s public trust doctrine imposes a
continuing supervisory duty to avoid unnecessary damage to the lake.220
What Mineral County II requires is an accommodation between existing
water diversions and the trust resource.221 This duty might require the
state to revise its definition of beneficial use, the measure of a water
right,222 to require diverters to improve the efficiency of their diversions.
The Nevada Supreme Court’s repudiation of water rights reallocation
would not foreclose the administrative or regulatory remedies the county
has recently proposed.223 Since Mineral County II answered only a
narrow, abstract legal question, the state court never considered what
measures the forthcoming accommodation might require. 224 But neither
the Decree Court nor the State Engineer can avoid the context: the
impending destruction of Walker Lake.
The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Walker Lake was both
innovative and disappointing. The decision recognized bedrock trust
principles and applied them to water rights but failed to clarify what that
recognition meant for Walker Lake. The principles that the court
articulated, however, offer considerable hope that public trust resources
like Walker Lake will not be destroyed by a prior appropriation doctrine
219 To be sure, the Mineral County II court assumed that Nevada’s public trust doctrine would
not save Walker Lake. See Mineral County II, 473 P.3d at 430 (acknowledging the “tragic decline
of Walker Lake”). That discussion, however, was classic dicta: the court only ruled on a single,
narrow legal issue—whether Nevada’s public trust doctrine would permit reallocation of settled
water rights.
220 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727, 729 (holding that “[t]he state as sovereign retains
continuing supervisory control” over the public trust water resource and that “some responsible
body ought to reconsider the allocation of the waters of the Mono Basin”); Mineral County II, 473
P.3d at 430 (barring reallocation of adjudicated rights, but nonetheless recognizing that “water
rights are subject to regulation for the public welfare and are characterized by relative,
nonownership rights”).
221 See Mineral County I, 20 P.3d 800, 808 (Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring) (explaining that
“the public trust doctrine operates simultaneously with the system of prior appropriation” and
urging the Decree Court “to determine if all appropriators can be accommodated by a plan that will
save the essentials of everyone’s water needs”); Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712 (“[B]efore state courts
and agencies approve water diversions they should consider the effect of such diversions upon
interests protected by the public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm
to those interests.”).
222 NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.035 (“Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of
the right to the use of water.”).
223 See 2021 Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 8–11; see also supra Parts V, VI.
224 See supra notes 154–157 and accompanying text.
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that historically failed to recognize the state’s antecedent public trust
doctrine, or by a state that fails to recognize its duty to make all feasible
accommodations to preserve public trust resources like Walker Lake.
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